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×Attorney General for Jersey v. Holley
Privy Council | 3 All ER 371 (2005)
When determining whether a provocation would cause a person with ordinary powers of self-control to react as the defendant did, courts must only take into account the age and sex of the defendant.
Bailey v. Commonwealth
Supreme Court of Virginia | 329 S.E.2d 37 (1985)
One who effects a crime through the use of an innocent or unwitting agent is a principal in the first degree.
Boro v. Superior Court
Court of Appeals of California, First District | 210 Cal.Rptr. 122 (1985)
Rape perpetrated by fraud in the factum nullifies consent, whereas rape perpetrated by fraud in the inducement does not.
Braverman v. United States
United States Supreme Court | 317 U.S. 49 (1942)
A single agreement to commit multiple crimes cannot be punished as multiple conspiracies.
Brooks v. State
Supreme Court of Ohio | 35 Ohio St. 46 (1878)
One who converts lost property to his own use while reasonably believing that the true owner can be found has committed larceny.
Bruce v. State
Court of Appeals of Maryland | 566 A.2d 103 (1989)
A defendant cannot be found guilty of the attempt of a crime that does not require specific intent.
Coker v. Georgia
United States Supreme Court | 433 U.S. 584 (1977)
The death sentence is a grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape and violates the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.
Commonwealth v. Azim
Superior Court of Pennsylvania | 459 A.2d 1244 (1983)
A conviction of conspiracy may be based solely upon circumstantial evidence.
Commonwealth v. Berkowitz
Superior Court of Pennsylvania | 609 A.2d 1338 (1992)
Verbal resistance alone is insufficient to show that sexual intercourse was obtained by force.
Commonwealth v. Cook
Appeals Court of Massachusetts | 411 N.E.2d 1326 (1980)
Mere evidence that the defendant was an accomplice to a crime is insufficient evidence to prove a conspiracy.
Commonwealth v. Koczwara
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania | 155 A.2d 825 (1959)
A defendant employer may be held vicariously liable for an employee’s violation of a regulatory statute.
Commonwealth v. McCloskey
Superior Court of Pennsylvania | 341 A.2d 500 (1975)
A defendant is not criminally liable for attempt if his plans never go beyond mere contemplation.
Commonwealth v. Peaslee
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts | 59 N.E. 55 (1901)
A defendant is guilty of attempt if he has a present intent to complete the crime in the near future and is in a position to carry it out.
Flores-Figueroa v. United States
United States Supreme Court | 129 S.Ct. 1886 (2009)
When interpreting a statute, courts look only to the plain and ordinary meaning of the text unless there is clear evidence that the legislature intended a different meaning.
Garnett v. State
Court of Appeals of Maryland | 632 A.2d 797 (1993)
Courts should not read a mens rea requirement into a statutory rape law unless Congress clearly intended for one.
Iannelli v. United States
United States Supreme Court | 420 U.S. 770 (1975)
Wharton’s Rule does not preclude a conviction of criminal conspiracy where such a result is contrary to legislative intent.
In re Banks
Supreme Court of North Carolina | 244 S.E.2d 386 (1978)
A criminal statute is not void for vagueness if it gives fair notice of the criminalized conduct and provides sufficient guidance to judges and defending lawyers, and is not void for overbreadth if there is an available interpretation that does not inadvertently criminalize permissible actions.
In re Devon T.
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland | 584 A.2d 1287 (1991)
A child is not criminally culpable for his actions if he is incapable of differentiating between right and wrong.
In re Meagan R.
Court of Appeal for the Fourth District of California | 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 325 (1996)
A victim of statutory rape cannot be convicted as an accomplice.
Keeler v. Superior Court
Supreme Court of California | 2 Cal.3d 619 (1970)
Courts are bound by the doctrine of separation of powers and the due process clause to rule strictly according to legislative intent when interpreting statutory provisions.
