Howe v. Hull

Fred Charon, an HIV-positive individual, took a prescription antibiotic drug and within two hours began experiencing fever, headache, nausea and other symptoms. Charon and Bruce Howe (plaintiff), Charon's companion, went to the Fremont Memorial Hospital (Fremont) (defendant) emergency room, where Dr. Reardon examined Charon. Reardon believed Charon suffered from Toxic Epidermal Necrolysis (TEN), a very serious and often lethal skin condition. Fremont protocol required that Charon’s admission be approved by the on-call physician, Dr. Hull (defendant). Reardon telephoned Hull and informed him that he wanted to admit Charon, who was HIV-positive and had a non-AIDS-related severe drug reaction. The focus of their conversation, however, centered on whether Charon’s HIV had progressed to AIDS. Hull did not inquire about Charon’s physical condition, his vital signs, or the particulars of Reardon’s TEN diagnosis. Hull told Reardon, “[I]f you get an AIDS patient in the hospital, you will never get him out,” and told Reardon to transfer Charon to the “AIDS program” at the Medical College of Ohio (MCO). Hull made no attempt to examine or see Charon prior to Charon's transfer to MCO. Charon was admitted to MCO and treated, but not based on a TEN diagnosis. Howe, as Charon’s representative, brought suit against Hull, Fremont, and others alleging, among other things, that their conduct and actions violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (FRA). Fremont and Hull moved for summary judgment on these claims, arguing that Howe had not shown that Charon was denied treatment based solely on his HIV status. Fremont and Hull claimed that Charon could not have been treated at Fremont becuse of Charon's TEN diagnosis.