In re Adoption of A.M.M.

C.P. and J.P. (plaintiffs) were Kansas residents who wanted to adopt the infant twins of their former foster child, E.P. E.P. was a resident of Missouri. On January 17, 1997, E.P. went to Kansas, where she and C.P. met with C.P.’s attorney and discussed the fact that if E.P. was a Missouri resident when the adoption occurred, the requirements of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) would have to be followed. Under the ICPC, a child could not be brought into a state for adoption unless all ICPC requirements were followed. C.P. and E.P. discussed that E.P. should move to Kansas prior to the adoption so that the ICPC would not be applicable. The plan was for E.P. to move to Kansas and rent a mobile home from C.P. and establish residency. Before E.P. moved on January 19, E.P. asked if C.P. and J.P. could pick up her twins to give her a break. C.P. and J.P. picked up the twins and took them to Kansas to care for them temporarily, not for the purposes of adoption. However, on January 21, E.P. also traveled to Kansas and signed a consent form permitting the twins to be adopted upon the consent of two potential fathers. Later, on February 12, E.P. began renting the mobile home from C.P. to establish residency in Kansas. By February 25, both potential fathers of the twins had expressed agreement or signed a consent form to permit the adoption. However, E.P. changed her mind about allowing the twins to be adopted and notified C.P. and J.P. of this by February 25. Despite this, on February 26, C.P. and J.P. filed for adoption. On February 27, E.P. sought a declaratory judgment permitting her to revoke her consent and provided a written revocation. Subsequently, E.P. moved for dismissal on the basis that the ICPC had not been followed. After a hearing on the issue of violation of the ICPC, a district court found that E.P. was a Missouri resident at the time the twins were placed for adoption on January 21 and that the ICPC applied. The district court found that the ICPC had not been followed and granted revocation of consent and dismissal of the adoption petition. C.P. and J.P. appealed, arguing that the court should have considered E.P.’s residency as of February 25 when the requirements of E.P.’s conditional consent were fulfilled, but this argument was without merit. C.P. and J.P. also argued that the revocation of consent was an improper remedy.