In re Alberto R.

Alberto R. (defendant) was a juvenile member of a gang who committed a drive-by shooting while riding in a car with other gang members. While the car passed through the rival gang’s territory, Alberto shot a person who was standing outside the regular hangout of a rival gang. Alberto and the other gang members were charged with several crimes, and a petition was filed alleging that Alberto had committed attempted murder and assault with a gun. It was also alleged that these crimes were committed as part of a gang, and the juvenile court held that the allegations were true. During a dispositional hearing, Alberto was sentenced to 17 years in the custody of the California Youth Authority, which included a sentencing enhancement of three years to be served consecutively pursuant to Penal Code § 186.22 subdivision (b)(2). Section 186.22 subdivision (b)(2) permitted a sentencing enhancement if a person was convicted of a felony in association with or for the benefit of a criminal street gang if there was a specific intention to promote, further, or aid the criminal behavior of gang members. The enhancement statute provided for additional punishment for one, two, or three years, with the court determining the enhanced term using its own discretion. Courts were required to select the two-year enhancement unless there were mitigating or aggravating circumstances. On appeal, Alberto argued that the language of the statute and the enhancement subdivision was unconstitutionally vague and that its application was overbroad in his case, resulting in a violation of his due-process, equal-protection, and freedom-of-association rights. Alberto challenged five different phrases in the statute, such as the phrase promoting, furthering, and aiding. Alberto alleged that this phrase and another were so vague and overbroad as not to provide fair notice of the prohibited conduct. However, the California Court of Appeal had already considered a similar challenge to this phrase and found that it was not too vague or overbroad. Alberto also argued that the specific-intent language in the sentencing enhancement did not prevent the statute from being vague, although he admitted that such language normally counteracts any issue with vagueness.