John Doe 1 ex rel. Jane Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Nashville

The Roman Catholic Diocese of Nashville (the diocese) (defendant) employed a priest named Edward McKeown from 1970 until 1989, when the diocese terminated McKeon’s employment. A priest at the diocese had received a report that McKeown sexually molested a boy in 1973 but did not believe the report. In 1986 the molested boy’s parent reported the abuse to a bishop, who confronted McKeown. McKeown readily confessed to the sexual abuse. The diocese sent McKeown for a 10-day evaluation at an institution, where he received psychotherapy and medication. In a report, a physician informed the diocese that McKeown was diagnosed with pedophilia and warned that he should not be around teenagers alone. McKeown had admitted to sexually abusing around 30 boys over a 14-year period. Thereafter, the diocese sent McKeown for intensive inpatient treatment for five months. Pursuant to McKeown’s release, a physician advised the diocese that McKeown required indefinite outpatient treatment and that he should never be given tasks that would involve contact with children. After treatment, in 1987, McKeown returned to his parish and continued his tasks involving children. The diocese learned of this by February 1989 and, upon learning that McKeown had given a boy a condom at a party, began the process of terminating McKeown. Thereafter, in 1990, McKeown informed the diocese that he had gained employment with a juvenile court clerk, a position that brought him into contact with minors. The diocese continued paying McKeown until 1994, although the parties disputed the reason for these payments and various other material facts. McKeown continued molesting minors he had met through the diocese. Also, McKeown had moved into a local mobile-home community, where he molested residents John Doe 2 (plaintiff) in 1994 and John Doe 1 (plaintiff) from 1995 until 1999. McKeown was prosecuted and imprisoned. John Doe 2, John Doe 1, and his mother, Jane Doe (plaintiff), sued the diocese for reckless infliction of emotional distress. The diocese sought summary judgment, which a trial court granted, finding that McKeown’s sexual abuse of the plaintiffs was too remote from the diocese’s conduct to be actionable. An appellate court affirmed, relying on cases from other states that held that the tort of intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress required that the alleged outrageous conduct be directed at a specific individual or in a plaintiff’s presence to be actionable. The Tennessee Supreme Court allowed the plaintiffs to appeal.