Lynch v. McDonough

After serving in the Marine Corps, Joe A. Lynch (plaintiff) experienced panic attacks, mood swings, nightmares, depression, and antisocial behavior. A private psychologist found that Lynch’s symptoms supported a diagnosis of PTSD. Lynch filed a claim for service-connected disability. A Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) (defendant) examiner confirmed the PTSD diagnosis but found that Lynch’s symptoms were not severe enough to interfere with social or occupational functioning. The examiner did not find the level of impairment noted by the private psychologist. The VA granted Lynch a 30 percent disability rating for PTSD. Lynch appealed to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (the board), and additional examinations by both the private psychologist and a VA examiner were submitted on the record. The board denied the appeal, stating that the private psychologist’s conclusions were not supported by the record or the subjective symptoms reported by Lynch. Lynch appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (the Veterans Court) and argued that the board had wrongfully found that Lynch was not entitled to the benefit of the doubt under 38 U.S.C. § 5107. According to 38 U.S.C. § 5107, when the record showed an approximate balance of evidence for and against a veteran’s position, the VA was required to give the benefit of the doubt to the veteran. The Veterans Court denied Lynch’s claim, relying on precedent from Ortiz v. Principi and stating that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule did not apply, because the preponderance of the evidence went against Lynch’s position. Lynch appealed, arguing that the current standard under Ortiz v. Principi required equipoise, or exact balance, of the evidence, which contradicted § 5107’s approximate-balance standard.