Seling v. Young

Andre Young (plaintiff) was confined as a sexually violent predator (SVP) pursuant to Washington’s Community Protection Act of 1990 (the act). The act authorized the civil commitment of SVPs, which it defined as persons who are likely to engage in predatory, sexually violent acts due to a mental abnormality or personality disorder. Young was convicted of rape six times in three decades. One day before Young was scheduled for release from incarceration, the state government filed a petition to have Young civilly committed as an SVP. At the commitment hearing, the jury unanimously concluded that Young was an SVP. Young challenged his civil commitments as an SVP in state court, arguing that the act violated the United States Constitution’s double jeopardy, ex post facto, due-process, and equal-protection clauses. The Washington Supreme Court held that the act was largely constitutional, reasoning that it was a civil scheme concerned with mental-health treatment and societal protection through incapacitation, rather than punishment for criminal culpability. Young then filed a habeas petition in federal district court against Mark Seling (defendant), the superintendent of the Special Commitment Center where Young was committed. The district court initially granted habeas relief, and Seling appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded Young’s case for reevaluation in light of Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), and then the district court denied relief. Young appealed, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court in part and reversed and remanded in part, reasoning that even if the act was civil in nature, it might be punitive as applied to Young, so the district court needed to consider the actual conditions of Young’s civil confinement. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.