United States v. Miknevich

Detective Scott Garland was investigating a peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing network implicated in the distribution of child pornography. A P2P network allows users to share files directly with other network members without routing through a central server. Garland searched the P2P network using known child-pornography terms and found a list of image and video files available for download. One particular video’s file name descriptively stated that it portrayed explicit child pornography. The video file had a SHA1 value, which is a type of unique digital fingerprint, that Garland knew to be associated with a child-pornography video. When Garland tried to download the file, the P2P network connected him with a computer that had the file available for download. That computer was identified by its internet protocol (IP) address. Garland sent his findings to Lieutenant Peifer, a computer-crimes specialist. Peifer viewed the video and confirmed it was child pornography. Peifer identified Steven Miknevich (plaintiff) as the owner of the IP address hosting the child-pornography video file. Using Garland and Peifer’s findings, state police applied for a warrant to search Miknevich’s computer for child pornography. The warrant application described how police identified Miknevich as the owner of the child-pornography video file and included the video’s descriptive file name and identifying SHA1 value. However, the warrant application did not include a detailed description of the video’s contents or a copy of the video. The district court issued the search warrant. Police searched Miknevich’s computer and found numerous child-pornography images. The federal government (defendant) charged Miknevich with possession of child pornography. Miknevich moved to suppress the evidence found during the search of his computer, arguing that the warrant was not supported by probable cause. The district court denied Miknevich’s motion. Miknevich appealed.