United States v. Voigt

After John Voigt (defendant) was convicted of money laundering, the United States sought forfeiture of Voigt’s ill-gotten assets. The district court determined that Voigt should forfeit approximately $1.6 million and ordered the forfeiture of certain jewelry pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1), concluding by a preponderance of the evidence that the jewelry was sufficiently related to Voigt’s money laundering because Voigt purchased it with money that was in a bank account that included money-laundering proceeds. Voigt appealed, arguing that the United States was required to (1) connect the jewelry to money laundering beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) formally trace the jewelry to money laundering because the account from which he obtained the money to buy the jewelry also contained untainted funds and there were numerous intervening deposits between the deposit of money-laundering proceeds and the jewelry purchases. Regarding the burden of proof, Voigt cited (1) the fact that § 982 did not contain a rebuttable presumption of forfeitability and (2) the reasonable-doubt standard applied to forfeiture under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The United States responded that the preponderance standard was appropriate because (1) § 982 applied only to defendants who already were convicted beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) the absence of a rebuttable presumption was irrelevant, and (3) RICO forfeiture was inapposite. Regarding tracing, Voigt argued that § 982(a)(1)’s express reference to tracing meant that the United States had to link the jewelry purchases to money-laundering proceeds. The United States responded that § 982(a)(1) did not require formal tracing, especially because tracing would be effectively impossible due to the fungibility of money and Voigt’s commingling of tainted and untainted funds.