Emmert v. Hearn

George Roberts died in 1981, leaving seven children. George’s son Richard predeceased George, dying in 1970. Richard had one son, Brian. George’s 1977 will left his personal property to his surviving children to be divided equally, and his real property to his daughter Miriam Eleanor Emmert (plaintiff) for her life in a testamentary trust. Upon Emmert’s death, the property would be transferred to an inter vivos trust. Under the inter vivos trust, the income would go to George’s surviving children, and upon the death of George’s last surviving child, the trust corpus would be divided equally among George’s grandchildren. The residue of the estate was to be transferred to the inter vivos trust. George’s estate was valued at $750,000. George’s real property was appraised at $425,000, his tangible personal property was worth $2,500, and his intangible personal property was valued at $324,000. Emmert was designated as personal representative as the estate. In that capacity, Emmert filed a petition seeking declaratory judgment that the term personal property was ambiguous and meant only tangible personal property, and that the existence of the residuary clause meant that George had intended for the intangible personal property to be placed in the inter vivos trust. Emmert argued that George did not intend for so much of his estate to pass directly to his surviving children and not according to the scheme in the inter vivos trust. Four of George’s surviving children (collectively, the defendant children) (defendants) opposed Emmert’s petition, arguing that the will was unambiguous and that extrinsic evidence of George’s intent was inadmissible. The trial court found that the term personal property was ambiguous and admitted extrinsic evidence, and the appellate court reversed, holding that the term was not ambiguous. Emmert appealed.