Jones v. Ministry of Interior Al-Mamlaka Al-Arabiya AS Saudiya (The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)

Ronald Jones (plaintiff) alleged that while in Saudi Arabia (defendant), he was tortured for 67 days by Saudi Arabian police. Ronald brought a civil action against both Saudi Arabia and the officers in a court in the United Kingdom. The appellate court ruled that Jones could sue the officers but not Saudi Arabia itself due to state immunity. Both Jones and Saudi Arabia appealed. The House of Lords considered whether the United Kingdom had jurisdiction to entertain a civil action against Saudi Arabia or its officials upon allegations involving torture. The United Kingdom’s State Immunity Act of 1978 (the act) provided that other nations were immune from the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom’s courts with limited exceptions that did not apply in this case. Jones argued that to uphold Saudi Arabia’s claim to immunity under the act would be to deny Jones’s right to access courts as implied by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Jones’s main argument was that the prohibition against torture in international law, such as in the Convention against Torture (the convention), prevented recognition of immunity for states or officials who committed acts of torture because torture could not constitute official or government acts subject to state immunity ratione materiae. Saudi Arabia countered by making four arguments. First, Saudi Arabia argued that state immunity ratione personae was not overridden even in the context of allegations that officials had committed crimes against humanity. Second, Saudi Arabia argued that Article 14 of the convention, which required states to provide redress to victims of torture, did not mandate universal civil jurisdiction. Rather, a private action could be had against a state for torture that occurred within its own jurisdiction. Third, the United Nations Immunity Convention of 2004 did not make any exceptions to state immunity in cases involving civil suits for torture. Fourth, there was no indication that nations had recognized a duty to assume universal jurisdiction for claims asserting violations of jus cogens or peremptory international-law norms.