Whiteley v. Chappell

The township of Bradford held an election for guardians of the township. Chappell (defendant) delivered to the person appointed to collect voting papers a ballot paper that was ostensibly signed by J. Marston. In fact, Marston had died before the election. Chappell was charged with having impersonated Marston in violation of 14 & 15 Vict. c. 105, s. 3, which punished by imprisonment for up to three months any person who willfully, fraudulently, and with intent to affect the result of an election impersonated anyone entitled to vote at the election. The magistrate convicted Chappell. On appeal, Chappell’s counsel argued that (1) a dead person could not be a person entitled to vote and therefore Chappell could not be guilty of impersonating a person entitled to vote at an election; (2) although Chappell’s conduct might have been within the spirit of the law, it did not fall within the letter of the law, and both were required for conviction; (3) in discussing a statute similar to one that made it a misdemeanor to impersonate a person entitled or supposed to be entitled to any prize money, Russell’s treatise on crimes cited Brown’s Case, 2 East, P.C. 1007, which held that the impersonation had to be of a person prima facie entitled to prize money; and (4) the Parliamentary Registration Act referred to any person who knowingly impersonated any person whose name appeared on the register of voters and specifically added “whether such person be alive or dead,” but 14 & 15 Vict. c. 105, s. 3, which Chappell was convicted of violating, provided only that the person must have been entitled, meaning the person could have voted himself. The prosecution (plaintiff) argued that (1) Brown’s Case was effectively overruled by Rex v. Martin and Rex v. Cramp, Russ & Ry., which held that impersonation of a person “supposed to be entitled” could be committed even if the person impersonated was dead; (2) the gist of the offense prohibited by 14 & 15 Vict. c. 105, s. 3 was fraudulently voting under another person’s name, and the harm caused was the same whether the impersonated person was alive or dead; and (3) as held in Regina v. Hague, 33 L.J. (M.C.) 81, such a statute would be liberally construed. Chappell’s counsel responded that the judges in Martin and Cramp must have held “supposed to be entitled” to mean supposed by the person impersonating.